In the late 1970s the money stock was growing at a faster rate than desired, the rate of inflation was accelerating, and the dollar was steadily depreciating in the foreign exchange markets. In an attempt to reverse these developments the Federal Reserve on October 6, 1979 announced several actions, including a change in its operating procedures to place more emphasis on managing the growth of bank reserves in order to improve monetary control.1 The new procedures are generally thought to have remained in place until October 9, 1982, when Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker announced that the Fed was going to temporarily place less emphasis on the money stock (M1) in its policy decisions. The period between October 1979 and October 1982 was characterized by unusually high and volatile shortterm interest rates, volatile money growth rates, and-towards the end of the period-a sharp drop in the rate of inflation. Many accounts of this period have attributed these developments to the new procedures.
The issue addressed in this paper is how the Fed's operating procedures actually changed in October 1979 and, more specifically, how movements in the federal funds rate were determined.2 Before October 1979, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) at each meeting set an initial target for the funds rate and gave a set of instructions to the Account Manager at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (the 2 The federal funds rate is the rate on overnight loans of reserves between depository institutions. Changes in the funds rate are important because they generally lead to changes in other shortterm interest rates.
"Desk") on how to adjust the funds rate over the period until the next FOMC meeting. These instructions related desired movements in the funds rate to the projected growth rates of M1 and M2 (relative to the short-run tolerance ranges specified by the FOMC) and to other factors such as inflation, economic activity and the behavior of the dollar in the foreign exchange markets. Each week the Desk reset the target for the funds rate based on the behavior of these variables and the latest instructions it had received from the FOMC.
The Fed stopped setting explicit targets for the funds rate after October 6, 1979, and a widely held view is that funds rate movements over the following three years were determined by market forces rather than by the Fed.3 According to this view, the critical aspect of the new procedures was that the Fed fixed the supply of nonborrowed reserves available to depository institutions so that increases in the money stock and hence in the demand for required reserves would automatically cause increases in the funds rate and other short-term rates. (The mechanism by which this occurred is described below.)
Despite the widespread emphasis on the automatic adjustment in descriptions of the post-October 1979 operating procedures, it was well-recognized at the time that movements in the funds rate under the procedures could also result from purely judgmental actions of the Federal Reserve. These actions included (1) judgmental adjustments to the supply of nonborrowed reserves in the period between FOMC meetings, (2) judgmental adjustments initiated at an FOMC meeting, (3) changes in the discount rate, and (4) changes in the surcharge that at times during the period was added to the basic discount rate and applied to large banks. 4 This paper evaluates whether funds rate movements from October 1979 to October 1982 were determined by market forces interacting with a nonborrowed reserve rule or largely on a judgmental basis by the Federal Reserve as in other periods. To make this evaluation, the paper presents a detailed breakdown and analysis of the policy actions affecting the funds rate in this period. I conclude that while some of the movement in the funds rate over this period resulted from the automatic adjustment, most of the movement-roughly two-thirds-was due to judgmental actions of the Federal Reserve.
Analytical Framework
Increases in the federal funds rate in the period from October 1979 through October 1982 came about in two general ways. The first was through an increase in the amount of reserves that banks had to borrow at the discount window (i.e., the amount not supplied by the Fed in the form of nonborrowed reserves), hereafter called the "borrowed reserves target."5 The demand by banks for borrowed reserves depends positively on the spread between the federal funds rate and the discount rate. Therefore, in general, the larger the amount of reserves banks had to borrow at the discount window, the greater the spread between the funds rate and the discount rate necessary to induce them to borrow these reserves. Consequently, at a given discount rate an increase in the amount of reserves 4 It should be emphasized that most Federal Reserve descriptions of the operating procedures in this period did not claim that funds rate movements were being determined solely by the automatic adjustment. Levin and Meek [1981] , Volcker [1980] , and the New York Federal Reserve Bank's reviews of monetary policy and open market operations [1980, 1981, 1982, 1983) all describe the effects on the funds rate of judgmental adjustments to the supply of nonborrowed reserves and changes in the discount rate and surcharge.
5 The term generally used in this period to denote the initial borrowing level specified by the FOMC for an intermeeting period was the "borrowed reserve assumption." This term was used because-as will be explained later in the article-under the procedures the amount of reserves that banks had to borrow in the period between FOMC meetings depended on the growth rate of money, which was unknown at the beginning of the period. Hence, the initial borrowing level changed as the period developed. The borrowing level specified for a particular week within the intermeeting period was in effect a target because under the prevailing system of lagged reserve requirements a target for nonborrowed reserves implied a specific level of borrowed reserves. To simplify the discussion and the presentation of the data. I use "target" for both purposes. As will be clear in the text, the use of that term is not meant to suggest that the borrowing level initially specified by the FOMC was fixed throughout the intermeeting period. banks had to borrow resulted in a higher funds rate. Increases in the funds rate in this period also resulted from increases in the basic discount rate or the surcharge. The funds rate had to rise following an increase in the discount rate in order to maintain the spread between the two rates necessary to achieve the borrowed reserve target in the current week.
The approach taken in this paper is to track changes in the borrowed reserve target, the discount rate, and the surcharge from October 1979 to October 1982 and to estimate how much of the resulting movement in the funds rate was attributable to the automatic adjustment and how much to judgmental actions by the Fed. The basic analytical procedure is to construct a series of tables which document the timing and cause of changes in the borrowed reserve target as well as the timing of changes in the discount rate and the surcharge. Table I illustrates the procedure with data for the period beginning after the March 31, 1981 FOMC meeting and ending May 20, 1981 , the day following the next FOMC meeting. Over this period the funds rate rose 3.96 percentage points. Similar tables for each of the intermeeting periods from October 1979 to October 1982 are in a working paper [Cook, 1989] . (A compact version of these tables is provided in the Appendix.) All information in Table I This section of the paper works through Table I to identify how much of the change in the borrowed reserve target in the intermeeting period ending May 20, 1981 resulted from the automatic adjustment and how much resulted from judgmental actions taken by the Federal Reserve. This information is used together with the changes in the discount rate and surcharge documented in Table I to estimate the amount of the change in the funds rate in this intermeeting period resulting from the automatic adjustment and the amount resulting from judgmental actions by the Fed. The following section of the paper provides similar estimates for the full period from October 1979 to October 1982.
The initial borrowed reserve target In the postOctober 1979 period the Federal Open Market Committee at each meeting chose an initial target for borrowed reserves for the period until the subsequent meeting. This target, which was generally called the "borrowed reserve assumption," is shown in column 3 of Table I . As noted above, the demand by banks to borrow reserves at the discount window largely depends on the spread between the federal The automatic adjustment in the borrowed reserve target6 At each meeting the FOMC also set shortrun targets for M1 and M2 over a period of two to four months. These targets are shown in column 1 of Table I , and the most recent projections of money growth are shown in column 2.7 The staff constructed a "path" for total reserves consistent with the money supply targets. In constructing the total reserve path, the staff allowed for the projected mix of currency and deposits and the projected demand by banks for excess reserves, and it took into account the reserve requirements for various categories of deposits. In practice, many of the non-M1 components of M2 were nonreservable and reserves on other components were being phased out under the Monetary Control Act. As a result, the total reserve path was determined primarily by the M1 target.
The staff also constructed a path for nonborrowed reserves by subtracting the FOMC's initial target for borrowed reserves from the total reserve path. The paths for total and nonborrowed reserves were then translated into reserve levels covering the shorter periods between FOMC meetings. The System Account Manager (the "Desk") was instructed to conduct open market operations in the intermeeting period in a manner consistent with achieving the nonborrowed reserve path.
The central feature of the procedures was that as the intermeeting period progressed, the path for 6 This brief description of the automatic adjustment is taken primarily from Volcker [1980] . For additional detail see Levin and Meek [1981] and the annual reports on monetary policy and open market operations by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York [1980, 1981, 1982, 1983] . Hetzel [1986] provides a chronological review of the implementation of the post-October 1979 procedures, and Goodfriend et al. [1986] provide a weekly rational expectations model of the procedures. Other discussions of the procedures are in Hetzel [1982] , Poole [1982] , and Spindt and Tarhan [1987] .
7 The projections of the monthly growth rates of the monetary aggregates shown in Table I are those made by the staff of the Board of Governors. If projections for a particular month were supplied by the New York staff but not the Board staff, then the New York staff's forecasts are shown in the table.
nonborrowed reserves was to be held fixed. If, for example, the projected growth rate of money in the intermeeting period rose above the target set by the FOMC, then the projected level of total reserves would rise above the path level of total reserves. With the nonborrowed reserve path held fixed, the emerging gap between the projected and path levels of total reserves due to the stronger-than-targeted money growth would cause an increase in the amount of reserves that had to be borrowed at the discount window. The funds rate would rise in the current week until the spread between it and the discount rate was large enough to induce banks in the aggregate to borrow these additional reserves. The result was that stronger-than-targeted money growth would automatically cause a rise in the funds rate, which was supposed to bring money growth back to target: over time.
In practice, the Desk made two modifications to the automatic adjustment as described above. First, although the Desk held the average nonborrowed reserve path fixed when there was an increase in the projected demand for total reserves in the intermeeting period, it typically made offsetting adjustments to the weekly nonborrowed reserve path in order to maintain steady borrowing over the remain-, ing weeks of the period (Levin and Meek [1981, pp. 7-8)] . Suppose, for example, that in the middle of a six-week intermeeting period new information increased the projected demand for total reserves by an average of $300 million over the remaining three weeks of the period, consisting of $100 million in week 4, $300 million in week 5, and $500 million in week 6. In this situation the Desk would reduce the nonborrowed reserve path by $200 million in week 4, leave it unchanged in week 5, and raise it by $200 million in week 6. The result would be to raise the borrowed reserve target for each of the remaining three weeks in the period by an equal amount of $300 million.
The second modification to the automatic adjustment described above was that the Desk made "technical" adjustments to the paths for total and nonborrowed reserves to allow for changes in the estimates of excess reserves and required reserves against deposits not included in M1 and M2. Suppose, for instance, that in the intermeeting period the demand for total reserves unexpectedly rose by $50 million due to an increase in the demand for excess reserves and by $50 million due to an increase in required reserves against bank liabilities not included in M1 or M2. If the Desk made no allowance for these factors, the necessary discount-window borrowing by banks would rise by $100 million. The higher borrowing level would force a rise in the funds rate even though there had been no increase in the projected growth of M1 or M2. To forestall this outcome, the Desk could raise the total and nonborrowed reserve paths by $100 million.
In the Report of Open Market Operations, the Desk reported a gap between the projected and path level of total reserves as an average over all the weeks in the intermeeting period. In the above example, where the projected demand for total reserves rose by $100 million, $300 million, and $500 million in the last three weeks of a six-week intermeeting period, the Desk would have raised the gap by $150 million [(100 + 300 + 500)/6]. The Desk divided fifteen of the twenty-six intermeeting periods into two subperiods, including the period shown in Table I . In these cases the reserve averages were calculated separately for each subperiod.
Column 4 in Table I shows the gap between the average projected and path levels of total reserves for the intermeeting period ending May 20, 1981.8 As the period developed, the stronger-than-targeted money growth raised the projected level of total reserves. The positive gap between the projected and path levels of total reserves that normally would have resulted from the stronger-than-targeted money growth did not appear at the end of the first subperiod (April 29) because, in order to smooth the transition between the two subperiods, the Desk decided not to make any of the sizable potential downward technical adjustments to the total and nonborrowed reserve paths (note c in Table I ).9 These adjust-8 In practice, the initial gap between the projected and path levels of total reserves at the time of the FOMC meeting was set equal to zero, although the gap could change in the first week of the intermeeting period if on the Friday following the FOMC meeting (usually on Tuesday) the staff's forecasts for the monetary aggregates differed from those made at the meeting. Setting the initial reserve gap equal to zero did not constrain the FOMC, since if the FOMC wished to engineer a change in the funds rate at the time of the meeting, it could do so by changing the borrowed reserve target from recent borrowing levels.
9 The sense in which the transition between the two subperiods was "smoothed" by this decision is as follows. In the first three weeks of the first subperiod, the actual borrowing level (column 8) ran below the borrowing target for the remaining weeks in the subperiod (column 7)-henceforth called the "weekly" target (discussed later in this section). Because of these past misses, the weekly target had to rise steadily as the subperiod progressed in order to achieve the average borrowed reserve target. The Desk did not make any of the downward technical adjustments to the reserve paths at the end of the first subperiod-which would have caused a rise in the revised average and hence weekly borrowed reserve targets-because the weekly target had already risen sharply. If the Desk had made the technical adjustments, the weekly target would have climbed more than it did at the end of the first subperiod and then fallen at the beginning of the second subperiod, rather than rising from ments were made in the second subperiod, however, and in that subperiod the gap between the projected and path levels of total reserves rose sharply. The final gap of $389 million for the intermeeting period caused an automatic increase in the average borrowed reserve target of that magnitude.
Judgmental adjustments in the average borrowed reserve target The Desk could also make judgmental adjustments in the average nonborrowed reserve path during the intermeeting period, which would cause offsetting adjustments of the same magnitude in the average borrowed reserve target. The judgmental adjustments in the intermeeting period ending May 20, 1981 are shown in column 5 of Table I , and the Desk's explanations for them are given in the notes at the bottom of the table. In the fifth week of the period (May 6) "given the size of the reserve gap, a decision was made, in consultation with the Chairman," to lower the average nonborrowed reserve path by $250 million and thereby raise the average borrowed reserve target by an equal amount (note d). In the sixth week (May 13) it was decided for the same reason to make another judgmental increase in the average borrowed reserve target of $120 million (note f 1). At the same time, the Desk increased the average borrowed reserve target by an additional $114 million "because of the undershoot in nonborrowed reserves" in the previous week (note f2).10 The total of $484 million of judgmental adjustments over the period more than doubled the increase in the average borrowed reserve target that would have resulted from the automatic adjustment alone. As a result, over the period the average target, shown in column 6 of Table I , rose by a total of $873 million from $1150 million to $2023 million. the first to the second subperiod as shown in column 7 of Table I . This example illustrates the operational difficulties in setting targets for average reserve levels.
10 The reasoning behind this adjustment was as follows. The demand for borrowed reserves was stronger than anticipated in the first week of the second subperiod, and the Desk decided to allow borrowing to come in over target (and nonborrowed reserves under target) in order not to dilute the effect on the funds rate of the-increase in the discount rate that week (note e in Table I ). In order to accommodate this miss in the borrowed reserve target, the next week the Desk raised the average borrowed reserve target for the subperiod by $114 million. If the Desk had not made this adjustment. the weekly borrowing target and the expected funds rate would have been lower in the last two weeks of the subperiod. The Desk occasionally made this type of adjustment to prevent misses in the weekly borrowed reserve target early in an intermeeting period or subperiod from unduly affecting the weekly target later in the period. This type of adjustment is discussed in more detail later in the article (pp. 13-14).
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Determination of the weekly borrowed reserve target
Column 7 in Table I shows the borrowed reserve target for the current and remaining weeks in the period (henceforth called the "weekly target"). This target, together with the discount rate, determined the expected funds rate in the current week. Changes in the weekly borrowed reserve target resulted from changes in the projected demand for total reserves over the period and from deviations of actual borrowing from target in the previous weeks of the period. To understand the calculation of the weekly target, it is useful to work through a week in Table I in detail. Consider the third week of the first subperiod (April 22), when the borrowed reserve target for the remaining two weeks in the subperiod rose by $198 million from $1282 million to $1480 million. Column 4 shows that in this week the average gap over the subperiod between the projected demand for total reserves and the path level rose from $33 million to $97 million. As explained above, this meant that there was an increase in the cumulative projected demand for total reserves over the fourweek subperiod of $256 million [(97 -33) x 4). With a fixed nonborrowed reserve path, the borrowed reserve target over the remaining two weeks in the subperiod had to go up by $128 million (256/2) to supply these additional reserves. The borrowed reserve target for the remaining weeks in the subperiod also had to offset the deviation of $140 million between the borrowed reserve target and the actual level of borrowing in the second week of the subperiod (1282 -1142). With a fixed nonborrowed reserve path, the borrowed reserve target in the remaining two weeks had to rise by $70 million (140/2) to offset this miss. Together, the increase in the projected demand for total reserves and the miss in the target the second week caused a rise in the target for the third and fourth weeks of $198 million (128 + 70) to $1480 million.
The borrowed reserve target for the current and remaining weeks in a period can also be calculated in Table I directly from the average borrowed reserve target and the actual level of borrowing in the previous weeks in the period. The average target in the third week of the first subperiod was $1247 million (1150 + 97). Given borrowing of $887 million and $1142 million in the first and second weeks of the subperiod (shown in column 8), the implied borrowing target for the two remaining weeks was $1480 million ((1247 x 4 -887 -1142)/2], which-as derived above-was up $198 million from the previous week's target of $1282 million. Over the whole intermeeting period ending May 20, 1981, the rise in the average borrowed reserve target of $873 million (2023 -1150) led to a total rise in the weekly target of $713 million (1863 -1150).
The discount rate and surcharge Increases in the discount rate were an important determinant of the funds rate in the October 1979 to October 1982 period. As indicated earlier, the funds rate had to rise following an increase in the discount rate in order to maintain whatever spread was necessary to achieve the borrowed reserve target in the current week.11 On two occasions during the period from October 1979 to October 1982 a surcharge was added to the basic discount rate and applied to banks with deposits over $500 million that borrowed for two consecutive weeks or for more than four weeks in a calendar quarter. (After October 1, 1981 the calendar quarter was changed to a moving 13-week period.) Increases in the surcharge also put upward pressure on the funds rate, although the effect was smaller than for increases in the basic discount rate because only large banks were subject to the surcharge (Sellon and Seibert (1982, pp. 9-12] ).
As shown in column 11 of Table I , in the intermeeting period ending May 20, 1981 there was a one percentage point increase in both the discount rate and the surcharge. The discount rate and the surcharge together with the weekly borrowed reserve target were used by the Desk to derive an expected federal funds rate for the week, shown in column 9. The actual level of borrowed reserves and the actual funds rate for the week are shown in columns 8 and 10.
Detemination of the funds rate In summary, in the intermeeting period ending May 20, 1981 the funds rate was pushed up by the automatic adjustment in the borrowed reserve target resulting from the positive gap between the projected and path levels of total reserves, by judgmental adjustments to the borrowed reserve target, and by increases in the discount rate and the surcharge. The effect of each of these factors on the funds rate depends on the characteristics of the demand function for borrowed reserves. Empirical work indicates that a $100 million increase in borrowed reserves in this period was associated with an increase in the spread between the funds rate and the discount rate of roughly 2.5 11 For discussions of the relationship between the funds rate and the discount rate under the October 1979 operating procedures, see Broaddus and Cook [1983] and Sellon and Seibert [1982] . basis points.12 (The Fed has long used this estimate in relating borrowing levels to the spread.) Using this relationship one can estimate that the $713 million increase in the weekly borrowed reserve target over this period raised the funds rate by 178 basis points. Forty-five percent of the increase in the weekly borrowed reserve target was due to the automatic adjustment in the average borrowed reserve target (389/873), and 55 percent was due to judgmental adjustments in the average borrowed reserve target (484/873).
Hence, one can estimate that the automatic adjustment raised the funds rate by 79 basis points, while the judgmental adjustments raised it by 99 basis points. The small $13 million reduction in the borrowed reserve target made at the beginning of the period by the FOMC lowered the funds rate by 3 basis points.
As discussed above, under the October 1979 procedures a one percentage point increase in the discount rate would be expected to raise the funds rate by roughly an equal amount, and this expectation is confirmed by the estimates of Sellon and Seibert [1982] . Hence, I attribute a one percentage point increase in the funds rate to the discount rate increase. Sellon and Seibert estimate that a one percent surcharge raised the funds rate by approximately 65 basis points, and I use that estimate in this paper.13 12 Sellon [1985] shows that the estimated relationship between the spread and the level of borrowing in the post-October 1979 period is sensitive to the choice of the dependent variable in the estimated regression equation and the treatment of the surcharge in the equation. In equations with a surcharge variable, the estimated effect on the spread of a $100 million increase in the level of borrowing is 31 basis points when borrowing is the dependent variable and 17 basis points when the spread is the dependent variable, although the latter estimate drops sharply if a correction for autocorrelation is made. In equations with borrowing as the dependent variable and a surcharge dummy variable entered multiplicatively with the spread, the effect of a $100 million increase in borrowing when the surcharge is zero is 20 basis points in one subperiod and 31 basis points in the second subperiod.
13 As Sellon [1985, pp. 12-18] emphasizes, it is difficult to obtain meaningful estimates of the impact of the surcharge on the funds rate. The surcharge was imposed only two times, and the first occurred in the midst of the 1980 credit controls. The effect of the elimination of the surcharge on the funds rate is particularly difficult to evaluate because in both cases the elimination occurred just as the funds rate was slipping below the discount rate and the Desk was effectively going off the nonborrowed reserve procedures. In any case, attributing the funds rate declines in these periods to a breakdown in the procedures rather than to the elimination of the surcharge would not affect the overall allocation of funds rate movements between those due to the automatic adjustment and those due to judgmental Fed decisions, since movements in the funds rate resulting from either cause fall into the latter category.
To sum up, estimates of the contribution of the various factors to movements in the funds rate over the intermeeting period ending May 20, 1981 are:
FOMC lowering of borrowed reserve target at beginning of period: -.03
Automatic upward adjustment of borrowed reserve target: .99
Judgmental upward adjustments in borrowed reserve target: .79
Discount rate increase: 1.00
Surcharge:
.65
The estimate of the total rise in the funds rate over this intermeeting period is 3.40 percentage points, which is somewhat below the actual increase of 3.96 percentage points. A little under 30 percent of the estimated increase in the funds rate can be attributed to the automatic adjustment. The rest resulted from judgmental decisions of the Fed.
Breakdown in the automatic adjustment
The automatic adjustment illustrated in Table I did not function whenever the demand for total reserves fell below the nonborrowed reserve path.14 In this situation the federal funds rate dropped below the discount rate and fell to whatever level the FOMC set as a constraint (Levin and Meek [1981, p. 26] ). In such periods borrowing at the discount window was no longer sensitive to the spread between the funds rate and the discount rate. Consequently, cuts in the discount rate had no effect on the funds rate. There were three such episodes in the October 1979 to October 1982 period: (1) from the middle of the intermeeting period ending May 21, 1980 to the first week of the intermeeting period ending September 17, 1980; (2) most of the intermeeting period ending August 25, 1982; and (3) a brief period at the beginning of the intermeeting period ending December 23, 1981. Table II shows the intermeeting period ending July 9, 1980, when the funds rate was -well below the discount rate. In this situation the Desk simply fixed the average borrowed reserve target at a minimal level of $100 million and adjusted nonborrowed 14 Strictly speaking, the procedure also broke down when the FOMC had flexible short-run targets for the monetary aggregates within the intermeeting period. For instance, in the intermeeting period ending July 8, 1981 the FOMC's short-run target for M1B was 3 percent or less. In this period the Desk accommodated the weak growth in M1B by making weekly downward adjustments in the reserve oaths. (See Appendix A. Table II reserves to reflect changes in required reserves.15 The funds rate was effectively set on a week-to-week basis at a level acceptable to the FOMC. Also, the two cuts in the discount rate in this period had no apparent effect on the actual funds rate or on the funds rate expected by the Desk.
Allocation of Movements in the Funds Rate over the Post-October 1979 Period
Table III provides estimates of the movements in the funds rate over the period from October 1979 through June 1982, excluding the intermeeting periods ending July 9, 1980 , August 13, 1980 , and August 25, 1982 , when the funds rate was below the discount rate and the automatic adjustment was not functioning.16 As in the example above, Table III allocates movements in the funds rate over this period to five sources: the automatic adjustment in the borrowed reserve target in the intermeeting period, judgmental adjustments in the borrowed reserves target in the intermeeting period, adjustments in the borrowed' reserve target made at FOMC meetings, discount rate changes, and changes in the discount rate surcharge. The assumptions used to allocate movements in the funds rate to each of these factors are: (1) an increase or decrease in the weekly borrowed reserve target of $100 million causes a rise or fall in the funds rate of 25 basis points, (2) a rise in the discount rate causes an equal rise in the funds rate, (3) a one percent surcharge raises the funds rate by 65 basis points, and (4) a decrease in the discount rate has no effect on the funds rate.
The first three assumptions were discussed above. The fourth reflects the circumstance that most discount rate cuts in this period occurred when the funds rate was below the discount rate, and in this situation cuts in the discount rate would not be expected to affect the funds rate. This expectation is confirmed by Sellon and Seibert [1982] , who find that reductions in the discount rate in this period had a negli- 15 The breakdown of the procedures in this period is discussed in the New York Fed's 1980 review of monetary policy and open market operations [1981, p. 72] : "As implied borrowing moved down to frictional levels, the Desk began to encounter operational difficulties that recurred from time to time through July." 16 I exclude the intermeeting period ending October 6, 1982 from the discussion altogether because the nonborrowed reserve procedures had effectively been abandoned by this time even though Chairman Volcker's announcement of the de-emphasis of M1 did not come until the end of the period. In line with the FOMC's instructions, the Desk in this-period adjusted the reserve paths to prevent the funds rate from rising in reaction to the rapid money growth in August and September, and the expected funds rate remained around 10 percent throughout the period. (See Appendix A, Table 26, in Cook [1989] .) gible effect on the funds rate. The Fed seemed to be aware of the funds rate's insensitivity to discount rate cuts at the time, as it generally accompanied reductions in the discount rate with announcements indicating the reductions were solely to realign the discount rate with market rates. In contrast, the Fed always accompanied increases in the discount rate with more aggressive announcements indicating the increases were being made partially, if not totally, for policy reasons.17
The totals at the bottom of Table III show that based on the assumptions above, the automatic adjustment in the borrowed reserve target contributed 22.02 percentage points to movements (in absolute value) in the funds rate over the post-October 1979 period. The contribution of the discount rate plus the surcharge was 14.81 percentage points. Judgmental adjustments in the borrowed reserve target caused movements of 9.83 percentage points.18 In all but three cases the judgmental adjustments were in the same direction as the automatic adjustment.19 Target changes at FOMC meetings contributed funds rate movements of 8.06 percentage points, the major part of which was in the first six intermeeting periods.20 After that the FOMC generally set the initial borrowing target close to the last weekly borrowing target in the previous period.
The estimates in Table III can also be used to evaluate the relative importance of different factors 17 Cook and Hahn [1986] provide a record of the discount rate announcements in this period. Seven of the ten cuts in the discount rate were accompanied by announcements indicating the cuts were being taken solely to realign the rate with market rates, whereas none of the six increases in the discount rate were accompanied by this type of announcement.
18 In the intermeeting period ending February 6, 1980, the weekly borrowed reserve target fell even though the average borrowed reserve target rose. As shown in the Appendix, this oddity resulted from large misses in the weekly target. In this case, I set the contribution of changes in the average borrowed reserve target to movements in the funds rate at zero.
19 As shown in the Appendix, in the intermeeting period ending February 4, 1981, there was a small decrease in the average borrowed reserve target and a much larger decrease in the weekly target, while the automatic adjustment in the average borrowed reserve target was negative and the judgmental adjustment in the average borrowed reserve target was positive. In this situation, the estimated impact on the funds rate of both the automatic and judgmental adjustments to the borrowing target were magnified given the nature of the estimation procedure as described in the text, These estimates are offsetting, however, and they have virtually no effect on the overall estimate of movements in the funds rate due to automatic versus judgmental adjustments in the average borrowed reserve target.
20 The sum of the estimated contributions to movements in the funds rate for all the factors is bigger than the total estimated movement because factors sometimes pulled the funds rate in opposite directions within a period. 
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the nonborrowed reserve operating procedures. In this period the automatic adjustment was responsible for only about one-third of the movement in the funds rate. The other two-thirds resulted from changes in the discount rate and the surcharge, judgmental adjustments in the borrowed reserve target in the intermeeting period or at FOMC meetings, and movements in the funds rate when it was below the discount rate and the automatic adjustment was not in operation. It follows from this conclusion that the greater volatility in interest rates and monetary growth rates observed in this period can not be attributed primarily to the automatic adjustment.24 24 It is of course possible that in this period the Fed's actions affecting the funds rate gave greater weight than earlier to deviations of the money stock from target or to deviations from target of other goals such as inflation. McNees [1986] estimates a Federal Reserve reaction function over the period from the third quarter of 1970 through the second quarter of 1986 with the federal funds rate as the dependent variable (i.e., the Fed's policy instrument). He finds increased emphasis on monetary growth over the period from October 1979 to October 1982, but otherwise concludes that the policy behavior that prevailed in the 1970s persisted in the 1980s. Similarly, Karamouzis and Lombra [1988] estimate a Fed reaction function over the 1973-82 period with the funds rate as the dependent variable. They find that the coefficient on the difference between actual and targeted money growth jumped sharply shortly after October 1979 and then fell sharply toward the end of 1982.
Possible Methodological Problems
This section discusses four questions that might arise regarding the procedure used in allocating movements in the funds rate to the various factors listed above. The main concern is whether the procedure might be biased in favor of the conclusion that movements in the funds rate over this period were largely due to judgmental decisions by the Federal Reserve.
One judgmental decision potentially affecting the funds rate not taken into account in the analysis of the preceding section is how much of the "technical" adjustments the Desk incorporated into the paths for nonborrowed and total reserves. As noted earlier, in setting the total reserve path at the beginning of an intermeeting period the Desk had to allow for the absorption of reserves by excess reserves and by required reserves against deposits such as large CDs not included in M1 and M2. Estimates of these technical factors would change as the intermeeting period progressed. In practice, the Desk used some judgement in deciding how to adjust the total (and nonborrowed) reserve path to reflect changes in the technical factors. This decision influenced the gap between the projected and path levels of total reserves, and consequently affected the borrowed reserve target and the expected federal funds rate in the current week. The Desk on occasion considered the effects on the weekly borrowing target and funds rate in deciding how much of the technical adjustments to include in the paths.25
A second question regarding the procedure used to allocate funds rate movements concerns the treatment of the judgmental adjustments to the average borrowed reserve target. Conceptually, one can divide these adjustments into two types: The first to engineer movements in the funds rate that would 25 For example, see Appendix A, Table 10, note 4, and  Table 22 , note 7, in Cook (1989] . See Levin and Meek [1981, Appendix 1] for a discussion of the technical adjustments in setting the reserve paths.
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not have resulted from the automatic adjustment and the second to prevent funds rate movements resulting from "shifts" in the demand function for borrowed reserves. To illustrate the latter type, suppose that in the first week of a four-week period a temporary (i.e., one-week) shift in the demand for borrowed reserves increased desired discount-window borrowing above the amount that normally would have resulted from the prevailing spread between the funds rate and the discount rate. Suppose also that rather than let this shift affect the funds rate, the Desk allowed borrowed reserves to be, say, $400 million more than had been targeted (and nonborrowed reserves $400 million less). The following week the Desk could raise the average borrowing target for the four-week period by $100 million (400/4), thereby leaving the weekly target for the last three weeks in the period unaffected by the temporary shift in the borrowed reserve function the first week.26
One might argue that adjustments in the average borrowed reserve target to accommodate past misses in the weekly borrowed reserve target resulting from shifts in the borrowed reserve function should not be counted as judgmental-as they were in the preceding section-because such adjustments were intended to prevent movements in the funds rate not resulting from the automatic adjustment. In many cases, however, it is difficult to identify from the Report of Open Market Operations those adjustments in the average borrowed reserve target made to offset past misses in the weekly borrowing target clearly resulting from shifts in the borrowed reserve function. At most, 30 percent of the judgmental adjustments at the end of the intermeeting periods were of this nature.27 If these adjustments were removed from the judgmental category, then additions to this category should be made for those occasions when there was a shift in the borrowed reserve function that the Desk did not accommodate, but such occasions can not be identified from the Report of Open Market Operations. On balance, it is possible that the inclusion in the judgmental category of those adjustments made to accommodate shifts in the borrowed reserve function may have biased upward the estimate in the previous section of funds rate movements due to judgmental actions, but the bias in any case was small. 26 For examples of this type of adjustment in the average borrowed reserve target see Appendix A, Table 6, note 2, and  Table 16 , note 10, in Cook [1989] .
27 Note that it is only the end-of-period adjustments that are relevant to this discussion and the previous discussion on technical adjustments, since the estimates in Table III are based on end-of-period figures.
The third question regarding the procedure used here is its focus on the extent to which movements in the funds rate were automatically caused by deviations of M1 from its short-run targets. Because the short-run targets were taken as given, a potential source of judgmental influence on the funds rate not captured by the analysis was the relationship between the short-run targets for M1 and the annual targets. I did not examine that relationship in this paper, but it clearly was not uniform over the three-year period. An important example is the second quarter of 1981 when the FOMC formally accepted short-run growth rates of M1 that were below the rate consistent with its annual target (adjusted for the estimated impact of NOW account shifts). The funds rate rose from 14.93 percent at the end of the April 1, 1981 intermeeting period to 19.93 percent at the end of the July 8, 1981 intermeeting period even though M1 was at the lower bound or below its annual target range throughout this interval.28 As a result, M1 finished 1981 well below its annual target range. (M2 however, finished the year around the top of its range.)
A final issue, and probably the most important, is that the analysis implicitly assumes that movements in the funds rate resulting from judgmental actions were not systematically related to movements resulting from the automatic adjustment. If they were, then one might justifiably argue that movements in the funds rate over this period were, in fact, automatically determined. To consider this possibility, I regressed the period by period changes in the funds rate resulting from all judgmental actions (JUDG)-the sum of columns 1, 3, 4, and 5 in Table Ill-on the changes resulting from the automatic adjustment (AUTO)-column 2 in Table III The coefficient of AUTO is positive and significant at the 5 percent level, indicating there was some tendency for judgmental actions to reinforce the effect of the automatic adjustment on movements in the funds rate. The low R2, however, indicates that the proportion of the judgmental movement in the funds rate that was systematically linked to the automatic adjustment was small. Moreover, this regression excludes data from the intermeeting periods when the automatic adjustment in the borrowed reserve target was not functioning and movements in the funds rate were determined solely on a judgmental basis (July 9, 1980 , August 13, 1980 , and August 25, 1982 .29 On balance, the evidence indicates only a weak link between movements in the funds rate resulting from judgmental actions and movements resulting from the automatic adjustment. To summarize, it can be argued that some of the adjustments in the average borrowed reserve target that I have counted as judgmental were consistent with the automatic adjustment because they were intended to accommodate past misses in the weekly borrowing target associated with shifts in the bor-29 The regression also excludes the period ending February 4, 1981, when there are large estimates-opposite in sign-of the contribution to funds rate movements of the automatic and judgmental adjustments in the average borrowed reserve target. (See footnote 19). The regression results deteriorate sharply when this period is included. rowed reserve function. (Although that argument is not compelling in my view, because there was no clear rule governing when such adjustments would be made.) Also, the evidence indicates that a small part of the movement in the funds rate due to judgmental actions was systematically related to the movement resulting from the automatic adjustment. These factors may exert some downward bias on the estimate of the proportion of the movement in the funds rate in the post-October 1979 period resulting from the automatic adjustment. Working in the opposite direction, however, is the judgmental effect on the funds rate resulting from the lack of rules (1) specifying how much of the technical adjustments to incorporate into the reserve paths and (2) linking the short-run M1 targets to the annual target. On balance, the questions raised in this section do not appear to significantly weaken the earlier conclusion that movements in the funds rate from October 1979 to October 1982 were largely determined on a judgmental basis.
this as a separate period, I treat it as a judgmental adjustment in the borrowed reserve target in the reserve target was set at $1.0 billion for the current week (the year-end week) and $465 million for each middle of the July 8, 1981 intermeeting period. In the week of November 28, 1979 there was $175 of the final four weeks in the period. The borrowing million "as of" borrowing that was reclassified as target was changed in the middle of the weeks of February 25, 1981 and December 23, 1981 follownonborrowed reserves the week of December 19, 1979. In the week of January 6, 1982 the borrowed ing FOMC meetings.
